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Judges "On the Take:"
A Formula For Financial Security
While serving as a superior court judge, plaintiff was indicted
for criminal conspiracy and bribery. Following indictment he was
"disqualified from acting as a judge pending criminal proceedings,"
pursuant to article VI, section 18, subdivision (a), of the California
Constitution. Subsequently, upon defeat in a general election for
a succeeding term in office but prior to judgment on the criminal
charges, plaintiff requested a disability retirement and pension
under sections 75060 and 75060.6 of the California Government
Code.1 The Commission on Judicial Qualifications, notwithstand-
ing the existence of a disability,2 found plaintiff to be ineligible
for statutory retirement by reason of his disqualification from
office. Plaintiff brought the present action seeking a writ of man-
date against the Commission and the Chief Justice to compel
approval of his retirement request. He was successful at the trial
level. While the mandamus proceeding was in progress, plaintiff
was convicted on four counts of bribery.
Justice Burke, writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court
in Willens v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,3 reviewed the
sufficiency of the medical evidence in support of the disability claim
1. The Judges' Retirement Law is contained in Chapter 11 of the Cal-
ifornia Government Code. Article 3, consisting of Sections 75060 through
75060.6, deals with eligibility and benefit allowances for disability retire-
ment. Under Section 75060, judges having a serious mental or physical dis-
ability which is or is likely to become permanent may seek a disability re-
tirement by obtaining the consent and approval of the Chief Justice and
the Commission on Judicial Qualifications. Under Section 75060.6, a judge
retired by reason of disability is entitled to receive a pension at half salary
for the remainder of his life.
2. Pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 75060, the judge had sub-
mitted written statements by three doctors who concluded that Willens was
mentally and physically disabled and unable to function efficiently as a
judge. One doctor, a neurosurgeon, reported spastic weakness of legs and
feet subsequent to a 1970 operation for spinal cord compression. A second
doctor, an internist, reported neurological and cardiovascular problems. A
third doctor, a psychiatrist, reported memory impairment. 10 Cal. 3d 451,
454, 516 P.2d 1, 3, 110 Cal. Rptr. 713, 724 (1973).
3. 10 Cal. 3d 451, 516 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1973).
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and concluded that the Commission's denial of plaintiff's request
had been in error. A criminal indictment was held to be no ground
for denial of retirement disability benefits, and a later conviction
no ground for their forfeiture.
The first issue with which Justice Burke dealt was a construction
of the provisions of the Judge's Retirement Law.4 The statutory
construction of the retirement provisions in effect lay the foundation
for the ultimate holding of the case. The court found no specific
provision within the Judges' Retirement Law for denial of Section
75060 retirement by reason of criminal indictment. The court noted
that the legislation has been liberally construed 5 and that the pur-
pose of Section 75060 was: " . . . to protect a disabled judge and
his dependents from economic insecurity through a loss of salary. '"6
In support of its position, the court stated that the purpose of
Article VI, Section 18 of the California Constitution is to " . . . pro-
tect the public and preserve the integrity of the judicial office pend-
ing resolution of criminal charges, rather than punish financially
an indicted judge . . . .-7 Furthermore, a legislative intent to
deprive a judge of disability retirement benefits prior to conviction
would be to ignore the precept that the accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty. The court pointed out that although
an indicted judge is disqualified from holding office, he is main-
tained at full salary during the period of disqualification and is
removed from office and deprived of his salary only upon final con-
viction.8 The presumption of innocence in criminal proceedings
was recognized as an underlying basis of these constitutional pro-
visions. This presumption was fundamental to the court's holding
that indictment could not justify a denial of pension benefits.
Justice Burke than turned to the second of the two principal
issues raised in the decision: ... whether a disabled judge should
4. Supra, note 1.
5. The court specifically cited Gorman v. Cranston, 64 Cal. 2d 441, 413
P.2d 133, 50 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1966), which directs liberal construction of pen-
sion benefits under the Judges' Retirement Law.
6. 10 Cal. 3d 451, 456, 516 P.2d 1, 3-4, 110 Cal. Rptr. 713, 715 (1973).
7. Id. at 456, 516 P.2d at 4, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
8. This is so provided in Article VI, Section 18, subdivisions (a) and
(b) of the California Constitution. Subdivision (b) also provides that upon
conviction the Supreme Court may suspend the judge from office without
salary. If conviction is reversed, the suspension terminates and withheld
salary becomes payable to the reinstated judge.
continue to receive disability benefits once he has been convicted
and either suspended or removed from office." Although this
issue had not been ripe for litigation at the time of the trial pro-
ceedings, plaintiff's criminal conviction had become final prior to
the present appeal. Although no adversary briefs were before the
court, it decided the issue was appropriate in order to avoid
additional unnecessary litigation.1'0
Arguments were raised on both sides of the question. Section
75060.6 of the Government Code provides that if a disabled judge
recovers from his incapacity he shall be a "judicial officer" of the
state and his pension allowance shall be terminated if he refuses
an assignment to a court by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
It was the Commission's position that a judge convicted of bribery
cannot be a judicial officer, cannot refuse that to which he cannot
be assigned in the first place, and therefore, the foregoing provision
might indicate legislative intent to exclude a convicted judge from
initial disability benefits. The court did not agree with the Com-
mission, and reasoned that a convicted judge no longer incapaci-
tated could simply be deemed to have "refused" assignment. An-
other argument was that because benefits under Section 75060.6 are
in lieu of salary, and because a convicted judge is no longer entitled
to salary, he should not be entitled to Section 75060.6 benefits. This
position was not persuasive. The court stated it was inequitable
to allow a pension only to those later convicted judges who fortui-
tously became disabled while still in office. But a countering in-
equity was recognized in those instances in which, after a period
of faithful service, a judge's incapacity had actually contributed to
or caused his guilty act. The argument most persuasive was
basically the same as the one by which the first issue of the case
had been decided: Because there is no express provision in the
Judges' Retirement Law relating to denial of Section 75060.6 bene-
fits by reason of felony conviction, no such provision should be
implied. Here the court relied principally upon the case of Pearson
v. County of Los Angeles," which held in part that a public em-
ployee's accrued pension rights are vested and cannot be destroyed
merely because of removal from office due to "misconduct." That
court reached its conclusion in light of Section 2604 of the California
Penal Code, which provides: "No conviction of any person for a
crime works any forfeiture of any property, except in cases in
which a forfeiture is expressly imposed by law . .. .
9. 10 Cal. 3d 451, 457, 516 P.2d 1, 5, 110 Cal. Rptr. 713, 716 (1973).
10. Id.
11. 49 Cal. 2d 523, 319 P.2d 624 (1957).
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If the case is assessed in its entirety, the necessary holding on
the issue decided first is that an indicted but otherwise eligible
judge has a vested and indefeasible right to receive Section 75060.6
benefits. When the court addressed the question of a convicted
judge's eligibility for the retirement benefits, it assumed that the
plaintiff already possessed a right to these benefits. The question
was whether or not they should be continued. Limited by the hold-
ing on the indictment issue the question had only one possible
answer. To have answered in the negative would have been to
effectively declare a forfeiture of a vested pension right by reason
of a criminal conviction. It will be demonstrated that the holding
on the first issue was too broad; it preempted vital considerations
which should have affected the outcome of the second.
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
A better solution to the indictment issue would have been to
recognize plaintiff's right to a temporary retirement and pension
during the period of indictment only. The court could have ordered
that a final determination of the right to a disability retirement
be made at the conclusion of criminal proceedings, subject to the
limitations and discretionary provisions of article 3 of the Judges'
Retirement Law.12 Such a solution would have been consistent
with the policy reasons the court found behind Article VI, Section
18 of the California Constitution.
A termination of temporary benefits and denial of permanent
benefits would preclude any forfeiture by reason of criminal con-
viction. Instead, temporary benefits would terminate at the con-
clusion of criminal proceedings regardless of whether or not there
was a conviction, and permanent benefits could not be forfeited if
they had never been granted.
The right to receive a disability retirement and pension is subject
to discretionary review. Section 75060, subdivision (a), provides
that a disabled judge "may" be retired "with the approval" of the
Chief Justice and the Commission on Judicial Qualifications. The
retirement is neither effective upon suffering the disability nor
upon submitting a request, but only "upon approval." Although
the right to the pension benefits is vested, "approval" is a condition
12. Supra, note 1.
subsequent' s to the actual realization of those benefits. 14 The
right is not absolutely vested.
Even without the foregoing argument, Section 2604 of the Penal
Code would be inapplicable because the decision to grant or deny
a pension does not depend on a criminal conviction. The Commis-
sion and Chief Justice, in the exercise of their dscretion, are not
bound by a guilty finding in a court of law, but are bound instead
only by their own evaluation of the offense charged. Whether a
conviction has been rendered may of course influence their decision.
But perhaps more important will be the relevance of the offense
charged to qualification for judicial office, and the existence of any
mitigating circumstances. For example, as the Willens decision
pointed out, the applicant's record of faithful service and the
possibility that the disability may have contributed to the commis-
sion of a crime are factors which should be considered.
The suggested alternative solution is not in conflict with the
Pearson case, supra. The Willens decision relied upon Pearson in
order to demonstrate the indefeasible character of plaintiff's pen-
sion rights. Pearson, however, does not compel the granting or sus-
taining of pension benefits in all instances. It only held that mis-
conduct could work no forfeiture of accrued pension rights1 5 in
13. "The fact that a pension right is vested will not, of course, prevent
its loss upon the occurrence of a condition subsequent. . . ." Kern v. City
of Long Beach, 29 Cal. 2d 848, 853, 179 P.2d 799, 802 (1947). The condition
subsequent in the present case is approval by the Commission on JudicialQualifications and the Chief Justice. See 38 CAL. Jua. 2d Pensions §§ 11,
13 (1956).
14. "Forfeiture" under Section 2604 of the California Penal Code has
been interpreted to mean a deprivation of a right to which one was entitled
at the time the crime was committed. In re Helwinkel's Estate, 199 Cal.
App. 2d 283, 18 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1962). In this case, the court found no ab-
solute right to a statutory family allowance and, therefore, no right forfeited
by commission of the crime.
15. In one sense "accrue" means to "arise as a growth" and to "periodi-
cally accumulate in the process of time." (Webster's Third New Interna-
tional Dictionary (unabr. ed. 1971)). Longevity retirement benefits under
the Judges' Retirement Law are based, to a large degree, upon time in office.Under Section 75060 of the California Government Code, in order to be el-
igible for longevity benefits, judges must contribute a prescribed regular
amount from their salaries to a designated fund. This plan is essentially
similar to that contained in Section 32050 of the California Government
Code, involved in the Pearson case. As to that portion of the pension al-
ready earned, by financial contribution or time in office, there is an accrued
pension right which should not be subject to denial for any reason. On
the other hand, disability benefits under Section 75060.6 do not require con-
tributions and are not dependent upon time in office. Not having been
earned, they are not due and therefore not enforceable until granted. See
38 CAL. Jun. 2d Pensions § 11 (1956).
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the absence of a provision to that effect within the pension plan.16
Unlike the disability pension plan in Willens, the Pearson retire-
ment plan applied to pension rights which had "accrued," in the
sense of having been earned. 17 A deputy sheriff was denied a
longevity retirement after dismissal without hearing for allegedly
having made false statements during a homicide investigation. The
court found that the deputy had not been lawfully discharged, was
entitled to a hearing on the charges, and that if found guilty would
be entitled to retirement rights accruing up to his effective and
proper discharge date.' 8 "Misconduct," in the absence of a valid
charter provision, was found to allow no forfeiture of accrued
longevity retirement rights.' 9 The facts in the case also included
the deputy's simultaneous felony indictment relating to the removal
of public records. However, the court recognized that the felony
charges did not account for the denial of the pension rights.20
Although convicted, no judgment was entered, and the felony
charges were expunged after a period of probation.2' No proceed-
ings had ever taken place to discharge the deputy from office or
otherwise jeopardize his pension rights by reason of the conviction. 22
In the New Jersey case of Ballurio v. Castellino,28 a foreman
in a city street department, although otherwise eligible for retire-
ment benefits, was held to be ineligible for a permanent award
while criminal charges on abortion were pending which, if proven,
would have justified his dismissal. The retirement statute did not
provide for discretion in denying a pension to an otherwise quali-
fied employee, nor was there any express good conduct requirement
or other provision relating to the denial of benefits by reason of
a criminal conviction. The court, however, held that the claim to
retirement benefits was not indefeasible; that abortion was a crime
of moral turpitude which would violate an implicit honorable
service requirement by reason of the applicant's position as a public
servant.24
16. 49 Cal. 2d 523, 543, 319 P.2d 624, 637 (1957).
17. Id. at 528, 319 P.2d at 627.
18. Id. at 543, 319 P.2d at 637.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 535, 537, 319 P.2d at 631, 632.
21. Id. at 529, 319 P.2d at 627-28.
22. Id. at 528, 319 P.2d at 627.
23. 29 N.J. Super. 383, 102 A.2d 662 (1954).
24. Id. 102 A.2d at 666.
Prior to Willens, there were other California cases, such as
MacIntyre v. Retirement Board of the County of Los Angeles,2 5
which described another facet of the nature of pension rights.
Persuasive counsel was taken of MacIntyre in the Ballurio case,
as have decisions in Michigan,26 Maryland 27 and West Vir-
ginia.28 Likewise, most other jurisdictions presented with similar
situations have made the same considerations as those expressed
in Ballurio and Maclntyre.29 In MacIntyre, police officers who
were suspended from duty and dismissed after trial before the
Board of Police Commissioners on charges of conduct unbecoming
an officer were denied longevity retirement benefits. The pensions
were subject to approval and to discretionary denial. The court
explained the fundamental nature of and purpose behind statutory
public employee pension plans: 8 0
It is assumed that upon acceptance of a position as an officer or
employee of a governmental agency, an appointee will perform his
duties conscientiously and faithfully .... It is never contemplated
that an officer or employee guilty of conduct warranting dismissal
should continue in office or be permitted to receive other emolu-
ments offered as an inducement to honesty and efficiency. The
right to a pension is not indefeasible, and an employee, though
otherwise entitled thereto, may not be guilty of misconduct in his
position and maintain his rights notwithstanding such dereliction
of duty. (Emphasis added.)
CONCLUSION
It is suggested that under Section 75060 the Chief Justice and
the Commission on Judicial Qualifications are expressly empowered
and implicitly required, in the interest of preserving judicial
integrity, to exercise discretion in granting the retirement status.
It is suggested that until such time as approval is given, the appli-
cant has a vested but not indefeasible right to the benefits arising
from section 75060. Where an applicant under indictment has been
granted disability benefits, it should be possible to exercise discre-
tion to review such benefits, especially in circumstances involving
25. 42 Cal. App. 2d 734, 109 P.2d 962 (1941). See also Taylor v. General
Tel. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 70, 97 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1971); Lawrence v. City
of Los Angeles, 53 Cal. App. 2d 6, 127 P.2d 931 (1942).
26. Van Coppenolle v. City of Detroit, 313 Mich. 580, 21 N.W.2d 903
(1946).
27. Baltimore City Bd. of Trustees v. -Comes, 247 Md. 182, 230 A.2d 458
(1967).
28. State v. Bd. of Trustees of Policemen's Pension, 148 W. Va. 369, 135
S.E.2d 262 (1964).
29. An extensive annotation on the effect of misconduct on pension
rights may be found in 76 A.L.R.2d 566 (1961).
30. 42 Cal. App. 2d 734, 735, 109 P.2d 962, 963 (1941).
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moral turpitude in public office. The policy considerations expres-
sed in MacIntyre and similar decisions undoubtedly reflect strong
current popular attitudes8' and should be influential in California.
In the present case, plaintiff should have been awarded tem-
porary pension benefits pending determination of the criminal
charges against him. Once the Commission had sufficient informa-
tion upon which to base a permanent decision, the request for a
Section 75060 retirement should have been remanded for such deci-
sion.
It is suggested that Section 75060 be redrafted in part to provide
(1) that a decision by the Commission on Judicial Qualifications
be based on consideration of all factors relevant to eligibility for
the retirement award, (2) that temporary retirement be granted
if disability seems likely, pending the establishment of any such
factors, and (3) that the Chief Justice not be allowed to overrule
the Commission's decision except where discretion has been abused.
The legislature now has the burden and should go forward in direct-
ing the court's attention to the discretionary provisions already a
part of Section 75060.
HARRY A. HALKOWICH
31. In the narrow area of judicial discipline in California, for example,
there have been some remarkable changes within the last 15 years which
are indicative of public policy. The Commission on Judicial Qualifications
was established in 1961. Section 75060 of the California Government Code,
enacted in 1959, has been amended four times and redrafted once. Art. VI,
Sec. 10, subd. (a) of the California Constitution was repealed in 1966 in
favor of Art. VI, Sec. 18. From 1959 to 1966, one other judge besides Wil-
lens, and two justices of the peace have been removed from office for dis-
ciplinary reasons. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 10 Cal.
3d 270, 515 P.2d 1, 110 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1973); In re Trindall, 60 Cal. 2d 469,
386 P.2d 473, 34 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1963). Three other judges were censured.
In re Chavez, 9 Cal. 3d 846, 512 P.2d 309, 109 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1973); In re
Sanchez, 9 Cal. 3d 844, 512 P.2d 302, 109 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1973); In re Glick-
feld, 3 Cal. 3d 891, 479 P.2d 638, 92 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1971).
In comparison, only one judge had ever been removed from office prior
to 1959. See Stewart, Impeachment of Judge James H. Hardy, 1862, 28 S.
CAIF. L. REV. 61 (1954). Art. VI, Sec. 10, subd. (a), of the California Con-
stitution enacted in 1938, provided for judges' removal from office by reason
of a conviction of a crime of moral turpitude, but had not been instrumental
in the removal of a judge. Removal by the legislature has been available
since 1849, as provided in Art. IV, Sec. 18, and Art. VI, Sec. 10 of the Cal-
ifornia Constitution.

